How to Break an Arbitration Scheme: The Letter That Cornered a Giant

What one employee wrote to stop a coercive arbitration policy dead in its tracks—and why lawyers everywhere should be paying attention.

Let’s stop pretending companies don’t know what they’re doing. Arbitration agreements are often rolled out mid-employment, quietly, through digital portals or rushed onboarding refreshers. You blink, you’re bound. You click nothing, you’re still bound. You object, they say you agreed by showing up to work.

It’s systemic coercion, packaged in HR-speak and legal ambiguity.

But this time, they ran into someone who didn’t blink.

The following is the real letter I sent to my former employer after they tried to force me into binding arbitration, mid-employment, with no bargaining, no consideration, and no escape. What they didn’t expect was a letter crafted to meet legal standards for constructive discharge, ADA retaliation, arbitration coercion, and pattern-based corporate liability—all in one.

I’m posting it now, in full, for three reasons:

1. To show other employees exactly how to respond when their rights are cornered.

2. To provide attorneys a live example of litigation-ready documentation.

3. To make sure Sedgwick—and companies like it—don’t get away with this in silence.

Below is the exact letter I submitted, unchanged except for the removal of my personal contact information. It speaks for itself.

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The Full Letter

To Whom It May Concern:

This letter is submitted in final resolution of the matter involving Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. (“Sedgwick”), following the company’s continued refusal to respond lawfully, meaningfully, or in good faith to the serious legal concerns raised over the past several business days. While a prior message framed my position as final, that presumption rested on the belief that Sedgwick would engage in lawful, good-faith dialogue upon receipt of clear legal objections. It did not. Therefore, this letter finalizes my position in light of Sedgwick’s continued refusal to correct its own violations or meaningfully mitigate the harm caused. 

Although this escalation has occurred within a short timeframe, it is not the product of haste, but of necessity. Sedgwick’s violations were immediate: a mid-employment attempt to force arbitration through coercive means, a retaliatory stance in response to my written legal objections, and a structural failure in which the same system that caused medical harm was positioned to evaluate my ADA accommodation request. I did not rush this process—Sedgwick simply refused to participate in it. Every deadline that now exists was created by the company’s own silence and inaction.

Let me state this plainly: I have been constructively discharged. Sedgwick’s actions left me with no reasonable option to continue employment without waiving federally protected rights or submitting to a process irreparably compromised by conflict of interest and retaliatory posture. This letter now documents, for legal record, the final basis of that discharge and the damages flowing from it.

From March 21 through March 27, 2025, I submitted multiple legal objections to the company’s arbitration agreement. These objections were based on settled law and preserved in writing, including citations to Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 531 U.S. 79 (2000) and Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83 (2000). I proposed a revised agreement. I offered negotiation. I submitted terms. Sedgwick responded only with silence, deflection, and a stated intention to enforce an agreement I explicitly rejected.

That posture was not only coercive—it placed the company in violation of both FAA standards and general contract law concerning assent, consideration, and voluntariness. Under established Florida contract law and relevant federal precedent, consent cannot be inferred from silence or continued employment where formal written objection has been raised. See Quintana v. Miami-Dade County, 2020 WL 5548800 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (holding that continued employment does not constitute meaningful assent where no voluntary agreement was reached). The notion that an employee may be bound to forfeit core legal rights through inaction—after raising formal legal objections—undermines the most basic principles of contract formation.

Following this, I submitted a formal ADA accommodation request based on documented emotional harm arising from Sedgwick’s actions. The request was not frivolous. It was filed in good faith, in compliance with ADA procedure, and consistent with the timing of medical symptoms I communicated. In response, Sedgwick routed that request through the same internal structure that created the harm—without separation, without neutrality, and without pause. This is not a procedural flaw. It is a conflict of interest. When a company serves as both the source of injury and the reviewer of the accommodation for that injury, no legitimate ADA process can occur.

The ADA requires that accommodation processes be interactive, timely, and free from retaliation. Sedgwick’s failure to initiate separation of roles—despite its dual position as both the source of injury and the reviewer of that injury—constitutes a breakdown of process, not mere delay. A process cannot be neutral if the party causing the harm retains sole control over the evaluation of that harm.

At no point did Sedgwick meaningfully acknowledge my legal concerns. Instead, it allowed critical ticketing requests to be routed to personnel on personal leave. It issued no acknowledgement of legal deadlines or settlement terms. It declined to initiate any form of privileged dialogue, mediation, or reconsideration of the agreement. It declined, in short, to act like a lawful employer.

That silence has consequences. The company has now triggered not only exposure under the ADA and FAA, but also potential scrutiny under the NLRA and general whistleblower protections. My postings in internal chatrooms, submission of legal objections, and ADA filing all qualify as protected activity. Sedgwick’s refusal to separate retaliation from review—its insistence on controlling the entire harm-response pipeline—is a structural failure with implications beyond this case.

Courts have consistently held that where continued employment would require waiver of statutory rights or submission to a retaliatory process, resignation becomes not voluntary but compelled. See Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547 (2016).

To the extent Sedgwick attempts to shield internal communications under privilege, that protection may be lost if those communications pertain to retaliatory conduct, obstruction of ADA rights, or enforcement of an unlawful agreement despite known objections. Courts have held that privilege cannot shield unlawful employer conduct.

This conduct is not anomalous. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. has faced repeated litigation involving retaliation, ADA conflicts, and coercive arbitration enforcement. My experience reflects those same operational failures. The same structural decisions that caused past legal liability have been repeated here—despite prior litigation, exposure, and reputational harm. That pattern now includes my case.

Moreover, if Sedgwick chooses to allow this matter to proceed to litigation, the consequences will not be limited to damages. The company’s ADA processing structure may be subject to pattern-based challenge. Its arbitration enforcement tactics may fall under judicial review for procedural unconscionability. And depending on how discovery unfolds, internal privilege may be lost on communications directly tied to retaliatory conduct and flawed ADA review.

It is in this context that I am offering one final opportunity for confidential resolution. To be clear, this offer is not speculative. It is calibrated based on enforceable damages, foreseeable reputational harm, and procedural violations already preserved in written record. It also reflects the significant financial and structural liability Sedgwick may face if compelled to defend its actions before a jury, court, or regulatory body.

Accordingly, I am willing to resolve this matter in full for a confidential severance settlement of two million five hundred thousand dollars ($2,500,000.00), subject to a mutually negotiated release agreement, strict confidentiality, non-disparagement, and no admission of liability by either party. This is a final offer. It reflects not just the harm suffered, but the restraint I have exercised in seeking resolution without escalation.

This offer remains open until Friday, April 4, 2025, at 5:00 PM Eastern Time. If no good-faith engagement is made by that deadline, I will consider the matter formally rejected. At that point, I reserve the right to proceed by filing with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Florida Commission on Human Relations, or initiating litigation through retained counsel in state or federal court.

Please direct all communication regarding this matter to my personal contact information below. I will not access internal ticketing systems or portals, and any silence will be interpreted as a final rejection of this offer.

Sincerely,Thomas Mix

(Contact information removed for publication)

Litigation History and Governing LawThe claims and assertions in this letter are grounded not only in established law but also in Sedgwick’s known litigation history, which demonstrates a repeated pattern of the very conduct described herein.

1. Ribeiro, et al. v. Sedgwick LLP
   U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California

• Nature: Class action by female attorneys alleging systemic gender discrimination in pay and promotion at Sedgwick LLP.

• Laws Invoked:
   - Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
   - Equal Pay Act of 1963
   - California Unfair Competition Law

• Details: Plaintiffs alleged opaque compensation structures and discriminatory advancement policies.

• Outcome: Moved to arbitration; outcome not publicly disclosed.

• Relevance: Establishes a pattern of internal opacity, retaliatory silence, and enforcement of arbitration over public resolution—now repeated here.

2. Ng v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. et al
   U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York

• Nature: ERISA-based suit involving denial or mishandling of disability benefits.

• Laws Invoked:
   - Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)

• Details: Dispute involved improper benefit denial and alleged procedural violations.

• Outcome: Procedural orders issued in 2024; core dispute remains unresolved publicly.

• Relevance: Aligns with Sedgwick’s repeated failure to process disability-related claims lawfully—an issue also present in the ADA conflict in my case.

3. Ford v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc.
   Delaware Superior Court

• Nature: Alleged ERISA and/or state law violations related to benefits administration.

• Outcome: Decided in 2020; details not publicly disclosed.

• Relevance: Reinforces pattern of exposure involving disability benefit management.

Legal Standards and Case Law Supporting My Claims

Constructive Discharge

• Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004): Constructive discharge occurs when working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel forced to resign.

• Application: Sedgwick’s coercion, retaliation, and ADA failure made continued employment untenable.

ADA Retaliation and Conflict of Interest

• EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 630 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2010): Retaliation for ADA accommodation requests violates the law.

• Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2008): Refusal to engage in interactive accommodation process constitutes ADA violation.

• Application: Sedgwick routed my ADA request through the very system that caused the harm—creating an irreconcilable conflict.

Arbitration and Procedural Unconscionability

• Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83 (2000): Arbitration agreements must be mutual, fair, and voluntary.

• Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 531 U.S. 79 (2000): FAA does not shield agreements that impose structurally unfair burdens.

• Application: Sedgwick enforced an arbitration agreement mid-employment, without consent, negotiation, or consideration.

Protected Activity and Chilling Effect

• NLRB v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 919 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1990): Protected concerted activity under the NLRA includes internal objections and discussion of employment conditions.

• Application: My postings and legal objections were protected. Sedgwick’s failure to respond—and continued enforcement posture—chilled further protected activity.

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Conclusion: You Can Fight Back

Let this be a precedent. You are not powerless. You do not have to accept coercive arbitration shoved in front of you mid-employment, with no opt-out and no negotiation. And if you object? That’s protected activity under federal law.

Companies like Sedgwick depend on silence. They count on fear. They’re betting you won’t object, and that if you do, they can drown you in policy-speak and procedural dead ends. But here’s the truth:

When you fight back with facts, law, and structure—they fold.

This letter is not just about one employee. It’s a roadmap. Use it.

And if you're an attorney reading this, take it seriously. Sedgwick has a pattern. And that pattern deserves to be litigated into the ground.

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Postscript – Legal Clarity

This article was written and prepared prior to the execution of any settlement agreement. At the time of publication, no NDA or confidentiality terms were in effect, and this material is offered lawfully under the right to document, inform, and assist others facing similar abuses.